In the midst of the Cold War, both the US and the USSR competed to gain holdings both politically and economically in Afghanistan. As the Central Asian country deteriorated into political turmoil, it became a proxy conflict in the ideological struggle between two global superpowers. In this article, I want to understand what led to the invasion, look at what happened during the conflict, analyze the massive intelligence mistakes made both before and during this event, and offer some solutions.
Part One: Buildup
First, let’s look at some of the things that led up to the Soviet invasion. To understand the actual invasion and the intelligence failure behind it, it’s critical to understand the context. Different factors such as US policy, Afghanistan’s political turmoil, and Soviet aid all contributed to the USSR’s invasion.
In 1954, Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan made a final request (there had been previous requests) for US aid, which was denied by US President Dwight Eisenhower. The Afghan government, insulted and in need of support, therefore accepted Soviet military aid. At the time, Afghanistan had enjoyed good relations with the West, but had significant economic and security issues. When these events occurred, the Afghan stance changed as the USSR increased their presence in the region, transformed Afghan intelligence capabilities, trained the army, developed infrastructure, and created an economic chokehold on the country.
And when political divides worsened, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan split in 1967. Two factions emerged: The Parchamists, who supported Daoud and were led by Babrak Karmal, and the Khalqis, led by Noor Taraki. This split caused chaos, as Daoud struggled to govern Islamic tribes while also trying to reconcile the political turmoil caused by the split. Daoud faced resistance from the Khalq faction, who didn’t recognize his leadership, and Karmal, the Parchamist leader, used the fragmentation as means to consolidate power. In an attempt to solve his country’s issues, Daoud tried to move away from Soviet influence and seek better US-Afghanistan relations.
However, the USSR had other ideas. In 1968, Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev declared that all communist regimes would uphold the other, even by using military force. Known as the Brezhnev doctrine, this idea becomes important as the crisis in Afghanistan worsened as the USSR increasingly looked to intervene.
In 1973, things really started to get serious. Daoud, who had been Prime Minister, launched a coup against the King with the help of Soviet military aid. The training and supplies provided proved to be incredibly valuable, and ensured the success of the coup. Daoud and his party, now in power, supported Soviet Marxism and were loyal to the USSR.
But five years later, this regime was overthrown as well. The Khalq faction, in an attempt to erase the division caused by the PDPA’s split, attacked the presidential palace, executed Daoud and his family, and turned the position of Prime Minister over to their leader, Taraki. The US was alarmed at this communist revolution, but ultimately decided to recognize the new government and pursue good relations in hopes of keeping Afghanistan away from Soviet influence. Regardless, the new government forged close ties with Moscow. Despite this, intense political turmoil followed. Suspecting a potential Parcham insurgency, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin purged and executed many Parchamists and seized considerable power. This ruined the credibility of the government, and destroyed attempts to bring the communist revolution to Islamic tribal areas. This initiative was met with revolt throughout the country, as were social reforms that were resented by the majority of the population. The new government now had very little popular support.
Later that same year, the USSR and Afghanistan signed a friendship treaty in which the Soviets agreed to provide economic and military aid. This was meant to stabilize Afghanistan. The treaty also included a provision to allow direct Soviet interference if the Islamic insurgents threatened the government’s stability.
Over the next year, insurgency intensified to the point of near civil war. The Soviets secretly began brainstorming for people who could replace Taraki and Amin, and take control of Afghanistan.
In August of 1979, the USSR sent combat troops to Bagram Air Base near Kabul for security reasons. This prompted US President Carter to supply non-lethal aid to the Afghan mujahideen (insurgents fighting against their government). At this time, and even after another military delegation was sent to Afghanistan from the USSR, the US believed it unlikely that Moscow would become directly militarily involved.
Two months later, Deputy Prime Minister Amin and those loyal to him executed their party’s leader, Taraki. This infuriated Moscow, and Soviet combat units were sent to the border. While the US was unsure how to interpret Soviet actions, it was still thought that the USSR wouldn’t directly occupy the country.
As the mutiny grew, the Afghan Army became useless against the Islamic fighters, prompting Moscow to deploy additional divisions and even Special Forces.
Soviet public statements supported the regime in Kabul and denied any combat plans in Afghanistan. On the 5th, the first anniversary of the Friendship Treaty, the USSR said it would honor the military commitments of the treaty, but rejected western charges of military intervention and operations against counterrevolutionaries in Afghanistan. Simply put, Afghanistan and the USSR planned to work together.
Part Two: Invasion
On December 24, 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan under the pretext of the Friendship Treaty and upholding the Brezhnev doctrine. They killed Amin, and installed Babrak Karmal as the new head of the Soviet’s puppet government. With support from the US, mujahideen insurgents gained strength and spread across the country. While the Soviets controlled the cities, the mujahedeen moved throughout the countryside. The USSR resorted to bombing and depopulating rural areas to eliminate the mujahideen’s civilian support. Regardless, the mujahideen still had support from foreign nations. In 1980, the US initiated a program to support the mujahideen via Pakistan’s intelligence service, and Saudi Arabia agreed to match America’s contributions.
But this didn’t erase the struggles Afghans faced. By 1982, 2.8 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan, and another 1.5 million had sought asylum in Iran. Foreign support helped uphold the rebel cause, and people from Iran, Pakistan, China, and the US came both to fight and offer aid to the mujahideen. With anti-aircraft aid supplied by the US, the mujahideen were able to neutralize the Soviet air threat. Their weapons and combat quality improved with experience, war materials were shipped to the rebels, and foreign volunteers helped the fight. Slowly, they gained a clear advantage over Soviet troops.
In 1988, the USSR agreed to withdraw its troops and signed an accord with the US, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. On February 15th, 1989, the withdrawal was completed and Afghanistan returned to non-aligned status.
After the Soviet withdrawal, civil war raged across Afghanistan, setting the stage for the Taliban takeover in 1996, and creating a breeding ground for terrorism. Back in 1988, al Qaeda was formed by Osama bin Laden, who had been a major financier of the mujahideen, spending his own money and using his connections, as well as training foreign Muslim volunteers to fight for the insurgency.
The USSR never recovered from the loss of finance and public relations, which contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Part Three: Intelligence Failure
Intelligence is meant to reduce uncertainty, and guide decision-making. However, this doesn’t always happen. When information is incorrectly assessed or omitted, then the risk of intelligence failure increases significantly. While the US had and continues to have some of the most impressive intelligence capabilities in the world, no intelligence system is foolproof.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred, first and foremost, because of intelligence oversight. I want to look at some of the different aspects of intelligence failure that were present during this time, and explain why they contributed to the invasion. US action, or lack thereof, undeniably shaped the way that the event played out. Had the US taken a different course of action based on more informed analysis, the invasion may have been prevented, or happened in a completely different way.
Underestimation – the Carter administration, though reasonably well-informed of the build up and overall situation, maintained the belief until the end that the Soviets would not invade, assuming that Moscow would conclude the cost of invasion was too high. The US underestimated the USSR’s ability to mobilize and power, leaving the US shocked when Moscow did invade.
Assumption – US intelligence labored under the idea that the Soviet Politburo and military would act in a way they saw as rational. The Soviets approached the situation in a way they believed to be rational, but not according to the Western way of thinking. Not understanding that different actors have different definitions of rational decision-making has historically led to significant US intelligence failures. The US expected the USSR to act in accordance with US perception of Soviet self-interests. In reality, Soviet interests were quite different. The US intelligence agencies were focused on what they expected to see, which played a large role in this intelligence failure.
Judgements Went Unchallenged – Analysts never reconsidered previous judgments, instead using those inaccurate judgments to form new ones. By repeatedly dismissing the significance of Soviet military preparations, the US intelligence community (IC) never challenged previous assumptions made from inaccurate, outdated information, even when new information was available and further actions had been taken.
Reacted Too Late – because the US did not believe a military invasion was imminent, no preparations were made, nor were warnings given about the event.
Fell victim to deception – The KGB built up Afghan communist intelligence service, particularly KHAD, which became feared for the use of torture and assassination. KGB and KHAD agents penetrated CIA-backed mujahideen, the camps, and their headquarters. The KGB ran hundreds of “false flag” operations to flush out genuine rebels, and create the illusion of mujahideen rebels to create confusion. Essentially, the CIA failed to notice that their enemies had infiltrated CIA operations.
Part Four: Solutions
Ultimately, intelligence failures are inevitable simply because of the nature of intelligence, but there is always room for improvement. For this particular situation, I believe that two key solutions could have been implemented in an attempt to prevent this intelligence failure.
Multiple Advocacy/ Devil’s Advocate – Introducing new ideas and new points of view into debate and analysis could have prevented the US IC from becoming fixed on the idea that the Soviet military would not invade Afghanistan. Introducing a devil’s advocate, or simply advocates of alternative solutions/realities, would ensure that as many interpretations as possible are being considered, and competing possibilities are weighed.
Imagination – US analysts believed it unlikely that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, this is because they only interpreted Soviet actions with the perception of rationality in accordance with what the US believed to be in their self-interests. This led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the Soviet course of action. This insufficient imagination demonstrated that the US ignored the more puzzling aspects of the USSR’s behavior, and instead focused on the facts that confirmed their pre-existing beliefs, and ignored the facts that challenged it. By introducing outside-of-the-box thoughts, considering other opinions, looking at contradicting evidence and drawing new conclusions, intelligence agencies would have set themselves up for a more varied, diverse, and ultimately stronger approach to the situation. By creating more answers and more potential outcomes, the chances of an intelligence failure occurring decrease.
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By Olivia Grace