It’s widely understood that the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, regardless of whether or not it was a good idea, was uncoordinated and poorly executed. The Taliban, who took over less than a week after the withdrawal was completed, were left $7.2 billion in military equipment due to failed record-keeping. The chaos of the withdrawal allowed an ISIS–K terrorist attack at the Kabul airport to kill 13 US service members and several civilians. The US made little effort to institute a diplomatic or political system to ensure governmental stability, and essentially allowed the Taliban to seize power when the Afghan government, heavily dependent on the US, collapsed within days. Now, few foreign nations officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government. The impact on Afghanistan is just as severe. The economy has crashed, poverty has skyrocketed, and the people are cut off from the most significant sources of aid.
The Biden (and Trump) administration had believed that US intelligence capabilities would translate into success in Afghanistan. But clearly, that never happened. So twenty years, thousands dead, and billions of dollars later, let’s examine the impact the withdrawal has had, and understand the intelligence failure that made it such a catastrophe.
Afghan Impact
The United States and its allies cut off most foreign aid almost immediately, and the economy, 20 years dependent on this financing, collapsed. Most nations refuse to give aid to the oppressive Taliban government. But the Afghan people need help. More than half of the country’s 40 million population needs humanitarian aid, and children are half of that figure. Approximately the same amount face acute food insecurity, and over 90% of the population don’t have enough food. Hospitals are overrun, underfunded, and lack basic supplies, and support for education has tanked. Because aid funds have been locked out, organizations are increasingly unable to provide critical care that millions need. Furthermore, the Taliban’s decrees against women working in non-governmental aid organizations cut off some of the most vulnerable, not to mention unfairly discriminate against women. Because women workers in the aid organizations are often the only ones able to connect to other women, mothers, and children that need help, preventing women from working in this area will isolate so many Afghans in need. As a result of all of this, the situation in Afghanistan is considered to be one of the most severe humanitarian crises in the world.
The Taliban, despite being the current Afghan government, has proven itself to be unwilling and unable to address some of the most pressing issues in the country, only exacerbating these issues. Rather than uplifting the economy or focusing on the health of their citizens, the Taliban focus more on strict religious edicts and denying Afghan women basic rights. Censorship of the media has increased significantly, and has led to the torture and even forced disappearances of journalists. Similarly, those who have protested against the Taliban government have been arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and even killed. The Taliban have carried out revenge killings on previous government officials and public executions. In fact, a soccer stadium that should be used for fun and sports has once again been turned into an execution ground, terrorizing the public, and contributing to the general atmosphere of fear that has risen with the new government. Women are now required to wear clothing that may only show their eyes, are not allowed to attend school, are restricted from many workplaces, and are subject to strict sharia restrictions that their male counterparts are not.
The situation in Afghanistan is desperate. The economy is struggling, people are dying, and human rights have regressed significantly. Different international actors and organizations have made efforts to negotiate for better conditions and provide aid to the Afghan people, but there is much more that needs to be done.
International Impact
The United States prides itself on its role as a key international actor, and triumphs rhetoric about peace and global stability. Despite this, the withdrawal from Afghanistan was shockingly narrow-minded, focused only on US geopolitical interests. Most allies wanted the United States to stay in Afghanistan, citing concerns about the Taliban and about Afghan society. And despite Biden’s promises of multilateralism, his decision to withdraw was made virtually unilaterally, which blindsighted many European allies. Biden refused to extend the withdrawal deadline at the request of then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, sparking concern about how committed the US really was to the values-based world order.
After a chaotic, deadly, and surprising withdrawal, the reputation of the United States and President Biden was called into question. The United Kingdom commented on the lack of good leadership, the German chancellor expressed criticism of the withdrawal, and China has made remarks about ‘American weakness’. Right now, Biden seems to be trying to remedy this by changing his policy strategy in regards to Ukraine. Actively coordinating with European security leaders, providing aid, and allowing other nations to make key decisions are all ways in which Biden hopes to erase some of the concerns created by Afghanistan. Regardless, some still see the withdrawal from Afghanistan as a Western failure to create democracy and order inside of a struggling nation. With confidence in Western powers low, many fear that Russia and China will now be able to offer support to Afghanistan, capitalizing on Western failure. China and Russia are both actively engaged in business and negotiations with the Taliban, and there is a risk that Afghanistan becomes a stronghold of one of these nations, disrupting the global order and threatening the interests of the United States.
Even though the United States initially went to war in order to fight terrorism, international terrorist groups have increasingly found safe havens in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the withdrawal. The initial withdrawal deal had the Taliban agree not to ‘host’ foreign terrorists in the country, but several events have revealed the Taliban’s failure to honor that deal. The US killing of al Qaeda leader Zawahiri in July of last year revealed that the Taliban had been working with al Qaeda; Zawahiri was found at a residence owned by the family of a Taliban government minister. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s Taliban government has not only been supported by neighboring Pakistan in the past, but also has a strong alliance with Pakistan’s Taliban. Because of the terrorist concern that Afghanistan now poses, neighboring countries are wary of the threat. And rightly so – the Taliban have relations with several terrorist organizations, and have shown a clear inability and lack of interest in seriously tackling the issue, adding to the narrative of Western failure.
Intelligence Failure
A simple examination of the withdrawal reveals early planning failures. Not only was the Kabul airport, the most important exit point, unsecured, but thousands of troops were actually brought into Afghanistan in order to protect other soldiers during the withdrawal. On the most basic level, the Afghanistan government was unprepared to fight alone, which allowed the Taliban to sweep the nation, toppling major districts in a matter of days.
American intelligence agencies warned of the possibility of a collapse of the Kabul government and a rapid Taliban takeover. Reports leading up to the withdrawal show that the CIA had estimated the government would fall by the end of the year, and subsequent reports repeatedly shortened that timeline. Yet Biden repeatedly reassured the public that this was unlikely. So when the Taliban toppled the previous Afghan government in less than a week, the United States and its allies were shocked. The reasons why suggest an intelligence failure. Washington mishandled the intelligence it had, and other circumstances complicated decision-making – ultimately, culminating in a disastrous withdrawal and rapid victory for the Taliban.
First, the timeframe for the withdrawal didn’t take into consideration changing intelligence. July proved to be a major turning point in intelligence assessments, when agencies finally reported that Afghanistan’s government and security forces were in serious condition – but policymakers had made decisions before that point in time, meaning that the updated information was never seriously considered. Before July, some estimates from intelligence agencies allowed for up to two years before encountering a serious possibility of government collapse. But from April to July, new assessments and analysis challenged that conclusion. Spokespeople for the CIA and DNI admitted that intelligence had recently changed, which complicated the execution of withdrawal. However, intelligence agencies had long predicted an ultimate Taliban victory even before the withdrawal, and as policymakers moved to pull out of Afghanistan, reports of security forces’ capabilities grew increasingly pessimistic. Yet even with these discouraging assessments, Washington moved ahead with the withdrawal, and continuously reassured that collapse was not a possibility. Ultimately, the collapse of the Afghanistan government was predicted. But because of complications with the timeframe, assessments went unconsidered and policymakers weren’t informed about the decisions they were actually making and their consequences.
Second, accurate assessments about the capabilities of both the Taliban and Afghanistan’s security forces were either not available or were mishandled. The intelligence community had previously delivered a historical analysis of the Taliban to Congress, examining what the Taliban may have learned since the 1990s, and predicting what their rise would look like. The report predicted that the group would first secure border crossings, then take provincial capitals and secure territory in the north of the country, before finally taking Kabul. This, as we saw in the aftermath of the withdrawal, proved accurate. But this prediction, accuracy aside, was never even considered when planning American action. One part of why lies in the fact that intelligence agencies never gave ‘high confidence’ on their reports concerning Afghanistan. Information on the Taliban missed the facts that the group had already implemented ‘shadow governors’ in major districts, and had made deals with the previous political elite. With a lack of certainty regarding the state of the security forces and the Taliban, Washington easily justified ignoring certain intelligence reports. Furthermore, conflicting information from different intelligence agencies complicated matters. The CIA repeatedly released assessments expressing concern about the state of Afghanistan’s government and security forces, while the DIA and other Pentagon shops were more optimistic about their ability to defend against the Taliban. Washington itself was confident that the $80 billion and 20 years spent training the Afghan forces would pull through. Finally, there may have been a fundamental flaw in American intelligence. Reports that were given affirming that Kabul would stand and that Afghanistan’s army could fight were predicated on the assumption that there would be a fight. Assessments assumed that security forces could hold their own against the Taliban – the problem is, there never was a fight. Much of the Afghan army never fought to defend the nation, allowing the Taliban to sweep the country relatively unchallenged.
Implications
Understanding the intelligence failure behind Afghanistan offers critical insight in explaining why the Afghan government fell so fast, why the Taliban rose to power so quickly, and why the US was caught off guard.
The Biden administration has had to face challenging questions and answer to those concerned about the withdrawal. Biden has admitted to some mistakes, but for the most part has tried to spin it off as an overall success, saying that Taliban gains had been predicted, so it wasn’t surprising when it happened, and blaming the Afghan military for the collapse of the government. While these things are true to some extent, they fail to answer the larger questions. Why, after 20 years, trillions of dollars, and thousands dead, was there such chaos and danger in the withdrawal? Why was our nation scrambling to evacuate thousands of American citizens, embassy staffers, and Afghans? Why were we not prepared for the fallout?
Ultimately, the withdrawal from Afghanistan was precipitous, risky, and poorly planned. But the reasons why are a little more complex. Moving forward, future administrations need to be more considerate of the information they’re receiving, more prepared for alternate scenarios, and learn from the mistakes of the past.
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